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   In their research on Southeast Asian international relations, many scholars have heavily applied two 
mainstream theories—realism and constructivism—to the task of explaining security issues in Southeast 
Asia. Unfortunately, the capacity of realism and constructivism to rigorously strengthen explorations of 
Southeast Asian security issues has diminished, owing to a discrepancy between the theories’ discursive 
foundations and current Southeast Asian security culture. Given this diminishment in the theories’ explana-
tory power, the emergence and promotion of new theories in Southeast Asian international relations may be 
necessary. The current study comprises two sections. The first section will explicate the foundations of the 
mainstream theories’ discourses. The second section will explore the mainstream theories’ gradually re-
duced capacity to facilitate analyses of Southeast Asian security issues. !
Introduction 
Realism and constructivism have become two main-
stream theories among Southeast Asian international 
relations (IR) scholars. However, the capacity of real-
ism and constructivism to facilitate rigorous explo-
rations of Southeast Asian security issues has dimin-
ished over time. This diminishment stems from the 
discrepancy between the two theories’ respective dis-
cursive foundations and current Southeast Asian secu-
rity culture. In light of these trends, the creation and 
promotion of other IR theories may be necessary. 
In this article, I explore these mainstream Southeast 
Asian IR theories in two sections. The first section will 
explicate the foundations of the realist and construc-
tivist discourses. The second section will identify the 
factors constraining these two theories’ capacity to 
facilitate analyses of Southeast Asian security issues.  
Mainstream Theories in Southeast 
Asian IR: Realism and Constructivism 
Realism and constructivism are two major main-
stream theories used by Southeast Asian IR scholars. 
Realism dominated the analytical framework for studies 
about Southeast Asian security issues from the early 
Cold War period to around the early post-Cold War 
period. Constructivism overtook realism as the pre-
dominant theoretical approach to the Southeast Asian 
security phenomenon during the demise of the Cold 
War and the 2000s. In this section, I will briefly intro-
duce realism and constructivism, including their re-
spective discursive foundations and arguments. The 
analysis will in particular focus on Michael Leifer’s and 
Amitav Acharya’s writings, because these two individu-
als pioneered the use of realism and constructivism 
respectively. 
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Discourses and Arguments of 
Mainstream Theories 
The Realist Approach: Michael Leifer 
Realism has been the most durable theory in the IR 
field. Its primary characteristic has been the assump-
tion that the world is anarchic. States are exposed to an 
atmosphere of mutual mistrust, where invasion by oth-
er states is probable if unmitigated cooperation is un-
likely, unless two or more states are galvanized around 
common challenges or concerns. Therefore, in order 
to avoid being invaded, a state’s first aim is not the 
improvement of its people’s well-being, but national 
survival.  The most effective means of survival is for 1
states to strengthen their internal material factors, such 
as defense capability, to the maximum capacity possi-
ble -- this is known as the doctrine of self-help.  How2 -
ever, when states over-enhance their material capabili-
ties, a security dilemma among nations is ineluctable 
and can be managed only through a balance of power, a 
scenario that the theory predicts. Realism, put simply, 
posits that the anarchical nature of international soci-
ety requires states to strengthen their material factors 
and seek a balance of power in order for survival. 
In Southeast Asian IR studies, the best known realist 
thinker is Michael Leifer. Discussions about IR theo-
ries, however, are rare in Leifer’s research essays, nor 
do the essays exemplify a direct application of realism 
theory to Southeast Asian security phenomena. Ralf 
Emmers, who gained his PhD under Leifer’s supervi-
sion, stated that “Leifer was less trying to make a con-
tribution to the IR theory debate than he was to making 
a contribution to the study of the international rela-
tions of Southeast Asia.”  In fact, Leifer’s research was 3
dependent on participatory field studies within 
ASEAN-related circles and on informal interviews with 
officials and diplomats.  Even so, Amitav Acharya, 4
whose theoretical stance stands in stark contrast to that 
of Leifer, has argued that Leifer’s perspective was 
“never self-consciously theoretical” and called his ana-
lytical approach “classical” rather than “scientific”.  5
However, Emmers did agree that Leifer was predomi-
nantly a realist.  In addition, Leifer is widely regarded 6
as a realist amongst scholars who have devoted their 
work to the debate between realism and constructivism 
in Southeast Asian IR.  Leifer has been classified as a 7
realist, then, because his writings are largely under-
pinned by realist notions, in particular the concept of 
the balance of power.  
Unlikely Multilateral-Cooperation and 
the Balance of Power 
Two realist concepts can be identified in Leifer’s 
corpus. The first is that effective cooperation, especial-
ly multilateral cooperation, amongst Southeast Asian 
countries seems unlikely, owing to an absence of 
common strategic perspectives among regional states.  8
Like other realists, Leifer acknowledged not only the 
situation of international anarchy,  but also the 9
salience of material factors.  At the same time, howev10 -
er, Leifer did not regard the absence of a common in-
ter-state government or the presence of a security 
dilemma as the sole causes of difficulty in the coopera-
tion between states. He seems to have believed that 
regional historical legacy, such as entrenched feuds  11
and long-running competition over territory  was the 12
main factor in the divergence of views among member 
nations.  Additionally, in Leifer’s analysis, most lead13 -
ers of Southeast Asian countries believed that coopera-
tion might lead a neighboring state to interfere in their 
own domestic affairs, which compounds the difficulty 
of cooperation.  Therefore, leaders unsurprisingly 14
eschewed the adoption of multilateral cooperation in 
order to maintain complete sovereignty and autonomy. 
It is interesting to note that Leifer disagreed with 
David Mitrany’s concept of functionalism. Functional-
ism dictates that states can cooperate on less sensitive 
issues at first, in areas like the economy and culture, 
before moving toward more serious issues, such as 
politics and security. This cooperation process is 
known as a “spill-over.” In the case of Southeast Asia 
however, Leifer argued that regional states showed 
little willingness to cooperate on straightforward is-
sues, let alone collaboration on more sensitive issues.  15
Leifer’s other realist notion is the balance of power. 
His use of the idea to explain Southeast Asian security 
issues, however, has drawn out both discussion and 
criticism.  According to Leifer’s realist argument, 16
given severe intra-regional differences, countries fac-
ing direct challenges or potential concerns are unlikely 
to embrace multilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, in 
the past, many regional states were badly in need of 
national stability, since they worried that the aggres-
siveness of any given states was a threat to their nation-
al survival. Insofar as multilateral-cooperation was 
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unlikely, bilateral cooperation based on the principle 
of balance of power became the primary option for 
regional states. Balance of power requires that all sides 
have shared goals or that they can achieve individual 
national interests through the proposed cooperation. 
In Leifer’s series of Southeast Asian security texts, he 
used examples to prove that many countries in the re-
gion cooperated with neighboring countries or exter-
nal powers using the principle of balance of power. For 
example, in the 1960s, Singapore and Malaysia as em-
bryonic independent states believed that British pres-
ence on their territory was beneficial to their own na-
tional security and stability, since deployment of the 
British troops could mitigate potential concerns.  In 17
January 1977, Malaysia and Thailand engaged in mili-
tary cooperation because they faced a common threat 
from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was 
supported by the Chinese Communist regime.  In18 -
donesia’s acceptance of the United States as an infor-
mal defence partner, and India as ASEAN’s formal 
dialogue partner, exemplifies the Indonesian balance-
of-power policy against the rising power of China.  By 19
the same logic, Singapore’s vulnerability in terms of 
natural resources and geographical proximity (Singa-
pore being located between Malaysia and Indonesia) 
prompted the country’s leadership to support the 
United States’ influential presence in Southeast Asia.  20
The Constructivism Approach: Amitav 
Acharya 
Constructivism is the alternative to realism in IR 
theory. Unlike realism’s claim that the world is essen-
tially in a state of anarchy, constructivism argues that 
anarchy is not immutable but “what states make of it.”  21
Under this theory, states’ interactions fall into the cat-
egories of enmity, rivalry, and friendship, or Hobbe-
sian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures.  Against this 22
backdrop, hostility and cooperation can be seen in the 
interactions between countries. Therefore, studying 
states’ behavior or national interests via material fac-
tors is insufficient. Also of importance are ideational 
factors, such as the creation of norms and identities, 
insofar as identity allows states to determine “who I 
am/ who we are”, a determination that helps knit states 
together.  Moreover, common interests may reduce 23
the likelihood of conflict and create a problem-solving 
mechanism for the realization of mutual benefits.   24
Constructivism is the other important approach in 
Southeast Asian IR. The study of Southeast Asian se-
curity issues focuses specifically on ideational factors: 
norms and identities. Constructivism thus explains 
why ASEAN successfully managed the Cambodian 
conflict,  why Vietnam regarded ASEAN as anathema 25
during the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia but nonetheless participated in ASEAN in 
1995,  and why ASEAN can be seen as a powerful re26 -
gional organization.  It is reasonable to argue that 27
Amitav Acharya, the prolific writer on Southeast Asian 
norms and identities, typifies the mainstream perspec-
tives of constructivist researchers in the field of South-
east Asian IR.  In the context of Southeast Asian secu28 -
rity research, Acharya’s work is antithetical to that of 
Leifer, although both authors agree that intra-regional 
differences in both Southeast Asia  and East Asia  29 30
have resulted in unlikely multilateral cooperation. In 
addition, other states’ aggressive policies and behav-
iors constitute the most pressing national-security 
concern.  However, in contrast to Leifer’s distinct 31
pessimism, Acharya argues that the foundation of op-
timism characterizing ASEAN can successfully counter 
seemingly insurmountable difficulties.   32
The Concept of Norms and Identity 
According to Acharya, “The ASEAN Way” exempli-
fies “a code of conduct for inter-state behaviours” and 
a “decision-making process.”  The principles of the 33
former can be found in the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), ini-
tially ratified by the original five ASEAN members in 
1976.  The principles of non-interference in the inter34 -
nal affairs of an independent country and non-use of 
force constitute ASEAN’s fundamental norms. The 
norms have guided ASEAN’s handling of regional 
problems, in particular security and political issues. 
For example, in the 1980s, ASEAN’s resolution on the 
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia 
strictly adhered to ASEAN’s non-interference and non-
use of force principles.  The resolution publicly de35 -
manded Vietnam’s withdrawal of forces from Cambo-
dia, and created negotiatory premises like “Cocktail 
diplomacy,” a by-product of the spirit of the “ASEAN 
Way,” rather than the establishment of a military al-
liance against Vietnam. Similarly, when Western coun-
tries denounced ASEAN’s acceptance of military-ruled 
Myanmar as a new member in 1997, ASEAN members 
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denounced Western countries’ violation of the non-
interference principle; in this way, “ASEAN did not 
depart from its non-interference doctrine in any signif-
icant way.”  36
The decision-making process has followed the prin-
ciples of informality and consultation (musyawarah) 
and consensus (mufakat) stemming from the informal, 
relaxed discussion process of Javanese village society.  37
The purpose of informality is to create a comfortable 
meeting environment where member states can coop-
erate with one another. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that ASEAN members avoid both publicly identifying 
who is a threat or a concern  and discussing sensitive 38
issues among fellow members.  From these facts, it is 39
reasonable to imagine that a military alliance in South-
east Asia would be unlikely.  Under the model of con40 -
sultation and consensus moreover, every state’s inter-
ests are considered and each perspective expressed, 
since decision-making does not require unanimity.  41
More importantly, to achieve the lowest common de-
nominator of agreement, ASEAN members usually 
negotiate before engaging with external powers on 
issues that are discussed within the forum. This tactic 
can influence divergent strategic perspectives among 
member nations and other states’ aggressive policies 
and behaviors.  42
In Acharya’s analysis, adherence to regional norms 
and the operation of a unique model of decision-mak-
ing prove that norms and identity do matter in South-
east Asia and provide advantages to ASEAN. First, the 
ASEAN Way increases the likelihood of multilateral 
cooperation. For example, ASEAN members were at 
pains to address the Cambodian conflict. Acharya ar-
gued that ASEAN’s responses to the Cambodian con-
flicts enhanced its international status and intra-re-
gional solidarity.  What is more, as a security frame43 -
work, the ASEAN Way has kept regional conflicts and 
the intervention of external powers in check.  The 44
ASEAN Way has, in fact, become the main operational 
principle of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 
first security-negotiating forum in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Internationally, external powers such as the 
United States and China have accepted the ASEAN 
paradigm.   45
The Two Theories’ Gradually 
Reduced Capacity to Facilitate 
Analysis of Southeast Asian Security 
Issues 
Realism and constructivism have become mainstream 
theories among Southeast Asian IR scholars. The is-
sues they tackle include regional security affairs  and 46
security relations with external powers (particularly the 
relationships between ASEAN and China).  These 47
scholars’ analyses of Southeast Asian security issues 
have provoked intense debates between realist and 
constructivist adherents.  However, the capacity of 48
these two theories to facilitate rigorous explorations of 
security issues has come into question, because of 
discrepancies between each theory and actual South-
east Asian security culture. In this section, my analysis 
of the two theories’ declining theoretical power will 
first address their relevance to Southeast Asian security 
culture in the previous eras. 
Theoretical Discourse in Line with Securi-
ty Culture in Southeast Asia 
Realism and constructivism have successfully helped 
explain Southeast Asian security issues because each 
theory has been notably applicable to the region’s se-
curity culture. From the Cold War period to the late 
1990s, security culture in Southeast Asia was state-
centric. During this time, regional states adopted a 
comprehensive security approach—particularly in In-
donesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.  According to basic 49
assumptions about comprehensive security, national 
insecurities stem not only from the military develop-
ment and aggressive policies of other states, but also 
from economic and social instability on the domestic 
front. States concluded that in order to achieve nation-
al stability, they must ensure economic and social de-
velopment domestically, an objective known as nation-
al resilience (ketahanan nasional). At first glance, 
this concept seems people-oriented, because a re-
gion’s nations would treat insecurities extending be-
yond the scope of military matters and into the realm of 
people’s well-being and security. In fact, comprehen-
sive security was still state-centric during this period, 
because regimes’ leaders were concerned mainly with 
national-security threats involving other states’ aggres-
sive policies and behaviors. For example, original 
ASEAN members regarded China as a potential con-
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cern, because the Chinese government showed sympa-
thy for Southeast Asia’s ethnic Chinese, many of whom 
had suffered unfair treatment at the hands of local gov-
ernments.  In addition, the Chinese government had 50
staked a claim to the oil-rich Spratlys Group of 
Islands.  These cases prompted ASEAN members to 51
suspect the Chinese government of interfering in their 
domestic affairs and of challenging their national sov-
ereignty. Thus, regional states unsurprisingly regarded 
territory and state sovereignty as paramount. A breach 
of national sovereignty would endanger individuals’ 
lives. In other words, the principle came to declare that 
individuals’ security is subordinate to national security. 
In addition, the principle declared that measures to 
countervail other states’ aggressive behavior should lie 
in the hands of states. For example, ASEAN states es-
tablished close military and political relationships with 
external powers and created regional norms and identi-
ties owing largely to Chinese aggression. In short, the 
concept of comprehensive security asserts that the 
state is necessary for human welfare. 
Realist and constructivist discourses for analyses of 
Southeast Asian security issues were cogent during 
this period. In Leifer’s analysis, states are the source of 
threats, and states deal with threats by enhancing their 
material capabilities and adopting a policy of balance of 
power. Leszek Buszynski also adopted a realist ap-
proach in explaining Southeast Asian security issues 
during the Cold War. According to Buszynski, ASEAN 
members regarded Vietnam as a potential threat to 
security and, consequently, used Chinese, Soviet, and 
American influences in Southeast Asia to countervail 
Vietnamese aggressiveness.  52
Acharya’s theoretical arguments have also been suit-
able for analyses of Southeast Asian security culture 
because, in his view of Southeast Asian IR issues, the 
primary source of threats is the state. The difference 
between Acharya and Leifer lies in their views on the 
methods that states adopt to address state-sourced 
threats. According to Acharya, states can counter other 
states’ aggressions through the creation of norms and 
identities, in line with TAC and the ASEAN Way.  53
Like Acharya, many scholars have adopted this way of 
thinking to explore security issues. As noted by Samuel 
Sharpe, ASEAN’s adoption of the principles of non-
interference and non-use of force to deal with the Viet-
namese military’s occupation of Kampuchea was due to 
Vietnam’s status as a source of potential concern for 
the organization’s members.  From Alice Ba’s per54 -
spective, ASEAN’s decision shifted the organization’s 
members into a closer engagement with China: 
ASEAN’s adopted measure was essentially an effort to 
create norms because ASEAN and China were suspi-
cious of each other.  55
Theoretical Discourse Out of Step with 
Security Culture in Southeast Asia 
Security culture has gradually changed. The linchpin 
of change can be traced back to the 1997 financial 
meltdown, deadly terrorist attacks in the United States 
and Indonesia since 2001, the outbreak of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.  These crises led to 56
crippling fiscal problems, greater income discrepan-
cies, and widespread unemployment. These calamities 
severely affected individuals and countries. In South-
east Asia, state-level problems often surfaced in the 
form of political turbulence—a good example being the 
May 1998 overthrow of Suharto, which came about 
largely because of his incompetence in addressing the 
concurrent financial crisis. Many countries in South-
east Asia have been beset by transnational crimes, like 
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and serious envi-
ronmental issues, which individually and cumulatively 
degraded people’s quality of life. Therefore, with all of 
these myriad and untested stresses coming to bear, 
ASEAN members had to start paying attention to new 
security challenges that were qualitatively different 
from previous challenges insofar as human beings be-
came a significant focus in the ASEAN agenda. A new 
language reflecting this concern for individuals is evi-
dent in many ASEAN declarations and documents, like 
ASEAN Vision 2020  and the ASEAN Charter.  By 57 58
2015, ASEAN planned to create the ASEAN Commu-
nity (AC), resting on a people-oriented foundation. In 
short, security culture in Southeast Asia increasingly 
favored human security. 
However, there was a discrepancy between each of 
the two dominant theories and the developing people-
oriented Southeast Asian security culture. Threats in 
the new security culture ran the gamut from unpre-
dictable phenomena, such as pandemic outbreaks and 
natural disasters, to intractable non-state human 
threats, such as religious fundamentalists, drug traf-
fickers, and warlords, whose networks are typically 
supra-national. The diverse origins of these new 
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threats rocked the foundations of both realism and 
constructivism, which declare that threats arise only 
from states. In addition, in the new Southeast Asian 
security culture, states are not the only actor to address 
threats. Solving challenges beyond state borders ne-
cessitates cooperation with other actors, such as re-
gional, international, and non-governmental organiza-
tions, because the negative effects of these new threats 
can spread across regions and indeed around the 
world. Therefore, individual states on their own cannot 
satisfactorily rise to these challenges. In short, South-
east Asia’s new security culture is no longer state-cen-
tric. 
The diverse origins of threats have rendered the two 
theories’ methodological foundations essentially inef-
fective. In the realm of realism, material factors do not 
provide a feasible way of eradicating many related 
problems because countries now focus their attention 
on materially unpredictable phenomena. An increase 
in countries’ material strength is by no means a guaran-
tee that they can avoid the negative effects of pressing 
threats. Moreover, countries need not pursue a balance 
of power to countervail unpredictable phenomena. 
Instead, countries should cooperate more extensively 
with counterparts, particularly regarding exchanges of 
information and cross-border educational efforts. In 
the realm of constructivism, the establishment of 
norms and identities cannot adequately resolve threats 
of diverse origins either. When crises spread, most 
countries find themselves in a difficult situation where 
they must respond immediately and appropriately. The 
chief motivation underlying countries’ cooperation 
with one another is the need for immediate action in 
response to critical, direct threats. Two examples of 
such threats were SARS, which struck Asian regions in 
mid-November 2002, and the 2004 Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami. As an aside, it is important to 
note that ideational factors may sometimes compound 
problems because of the required period of lengthy 
consultation.  In cases involving crises, neither norms 59
nor identities are necessary for cross-country coopera-
tion, since the impetus is the problem’s degree of ur-
gency rather than ideational factors. !
Conclusions: A Need for New 
Theories in Southeast Asian IR 
Southeast Asian IR has been dominated by theories 
of realism and constructivism for decades. Even though 
researchers have adopted other international relations 
theories, such as those associated with critical theory, 
post-modernism, human security, and feminist theory, 
these kinds of approaches have drawn little attention 
from scholars in the field of Southeast Asian IR. These 
scholars more often than not continue to use and dis-
cuss realism and constructivism. Undoubtedly, realism 
and constructivism are suitable for the exploration of 
certain Southeast Asian security issues, like the dis-
pute surrounding the South China Sea.  However, 60
because security culture in Southeast Asia is shifting 
from state-centricity to human-centricity, this has di-
minished the mainstream theories’ contributions to 
rigorous research exploring Southeast Asian security 
issues. As such, the creation and promotion of other 
theories in Southeast Asian IR appears to be advisable 
and perhaps even necessary. 
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